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RECENT SUPREME COURT EMPLOYMENT
LAW DEVELOPMENTS
Olati Johnson' and Douglas D. Scherer 2

This article discusses recent employment law developments
at the United States Supreme Court. Employment law cases took
center stage during the October 1997 and 1998 Terms of the
Supreme Court and important employment law cases were
pending, or have been decided, during the October 1999 Term.
This article briefly surveys the Court's employment law cases
during the October 1997 Term, focusing more extensively on the
Court's employment law cases during the October 1998 Term,
and then discusses two very important employment law cases
before the Court during the October 1999 Term, involving the
constitutionality of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 ("ADEA") 3 as applied to state government defendants, and
proof of discrimination in ADEA cases and Title V11 4 disparate
treatment cases.

Assistant Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund; Stanford
Law School, J.D. 1995; Yale College B.A. 1989; Law Clerk to Judge David
Tatel, U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, 1995-96; Law Clerk to Justice
John Paul Stevens, U.S. Supreme Court, 1996-1997.
2 Professor of Law, Touro Jacob D, Fuchsberg Law Center; B.A., 1962, Case
Western Reserve; J.D., 1969, Suffolk University Law School; LL.M., 1978,
Harvard Law School. He was in private practice in Boston; Legal Adviser on
Civil Rights to the Governor of Massachusetts; Commissioner, Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination; Lecturer, New England School of Law;
Associate Professor, New York Law School; member of several advisory
boards to Massachusetts Department of Education; member of the Executive

Board and Legislative Chairman of the Boston Branch of NAACP; and
President, Child Care Council of Suffolk, Inc.
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-650 (1994).
4 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)(1)-2000(e)(17) (1994).
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I. THE SUPREME COURT'S OCTOBER 1997 TERM
EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES
Three sexual harassment cases reflect the progressive
approach of the October 1997 Term. 5 In Burlington Industries,
Inc. v.Ellerth6 and Faragherv. City of Boca Raton,7 the Court

provided protection for victims of sexual harassment by imposing
vicarious liability upon employers for supervisor harassment if a
tangible employment action was taken (such as discharge,
demotion, or undesirable reassignment).
If no tangible
employment action is taken, an employer can avoid vicarious

liability for supervisor harassment only if it affirmatively proves
that it acted reasonably "to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior," and that "the plaintiff employee

unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
harm otherwise . . .8
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
5 See ROBERT M. BELTON, THE SUPREME COURT'S 1997 TERM, 2 EMPLOYEE
RTS & EMPLOYMENT POLICY J. 267 (1998). There is an excellent discussion
of the Supreme Court's employment law cases during the October 1997 Term.
6 524 U.S. 742, 757 (1998).
7 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) in which the Court stated:

In order to accommodate the principal of vicarious liability
for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority, as well
as Title VII's equally basic policies of encouraging
forethought by employers and saving action by objecting
employees, we adopt the following holding in this case and
in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth .... An employer

is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for
an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor
with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the
employee.
Id.
8
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765:

The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise. While proof that an
employer had promulgated an anti-harassment policy with
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Servs., Inc., the Court also held that the sexual
harassment
9
doctrine applies to same-sex sexual harassment.

The October 1997 Term yielded a progressive interpretation
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA").' 0 In
Bragdon v. Abbott,1 ' the Court held that an asymptomatic HIV
complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a
matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the
employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed
in any case when litigating the first element of the defense.
And while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the
corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is
not limited to showing any unreasonable failure to use any
complaint procedure provided by the employer, a
demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy
the employer's burden under the second element of the
defense. No affirmative defense is available, however, when
the supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible
employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or
undesirable reassignment.
Id.
Faragherand Ellerth should be distinguished from the October 1998 Term
decision in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629
(1999). Davis was brought under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act
of 1972, and not under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Title IX was
held to allow a private damages action against a school board for student-tostudent sexual harassment, but only where the school board is "deliberately
indifferent to sexual harassment, of which [it has] actual knowledge, that is so
severe, pervasive, objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the
victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the
school." Davis, 526 U.S. at 650.
9 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (holding "no justification in the statutory language
or our precedents for a categorical rule excluding same-sex harassment claims
from the coverage of Title VII").
10 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990).
"524 U.S. 624, 639-41 (1998). The Court noted:
the medical evidence leads us to conclude that respondent's
infection substantially limited her ability to reproduce in two
independent ways. First, a woman infected with HIV who
tries to conceive a child imposes on the man a significant
risk of becoming infected ....
Second, an infected woman
risks infecting her child during gestation and childbirth, i.e.,
perinatal transmission .... The Act addresses substantial
limitations on major life activities, not utter inabilities.
Conception and childbirth are not impossible for an HIV
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positive plaintiff was disabled under the ADA. Bragdon involved
a dentist who discriminated against a patient, violating the public
accommodation provisions of the ADA. 12 The significance of the
case was its broad interpretation of the statutory phrase
"substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
[an] individual." 13 The Court concluded that reproduction is a
major life activity and thus,
Sidney Abbott suffered a substantial
14
activity.
this
limitation of
A positive result for employees occurred in Oubre v. Entery
Operations, Inc., 15 in which the Court strictly applied the waiver
provisions of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990
("OWBPA"). 16 The Court held that a waiver of statutory claims
under the ADEA is ineffective if there is non-compliance with
the Act's "knowing and voluntary" waiver requirements. 17 The
Court also held that, if such a waiver is ineffective, a former
employee plaintiff need not "tender back" the settlement money

victim but, without doubt, are dangerous to the public health.
This meets the definition of a substantial limitation.
Id.
12 Id. at 628-29. See also 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1990), providing that "[n]o
individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who
owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." Id.
'" 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1990). This section defines disability as "hi
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities such individual." Id.
14 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638 (holding that "the plain meaning of the word
'major' denotes comparative importance" and "suggests that the touchstone for
determining an activity's inclusion under the statutory rubric is its
significance.") (citing the 9th Circuit in Bragdon v. Abbot, 107 F.3d 934 (9 'h
Cir. 1997)).
'5522 U.S. 422 (1998).
16 See Pub. L. No. 101-433, Title II, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§621-34).
1729 U.S.C. § 626()(1) (1990). This section provides in pertinent part that
"[a]n individual may not waive any right or claim under this Act unless the
waiver is knowing and voluntary .... A waiver may not be considered
knowing and voluntary unless at a minimum it complies with certain
proscribed requirements." Id.
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he or she received as a precondition to bringing an ADEA
action. 18
A decision favoring employees was issued in Geissel v.
Moore Medical Corp.,' 9 in which the Court interpreted the
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985

("COBRA") 20 in such a way that a person who terminated
employment has the right to continue his or her medical
insurance coverage with the former employer. 2 1 This applied
even if that person is covered, at the time of termination, under
the medical insurance of a spouse or other person.22 The
COBRA election right is lost only if the former employee
subsequently obtains coverage under another medical insurance
plan, after the date for electing COBRA coverage.23

I'

Oubre, 522 U.S. at 428-29 (noting that "[s]ince Oubre's release did not

comply with the OWBPA's stringent safeguards, it is unenforceable against
her insofar as it purports to waive or release her ADEA claim. As a statutory
matter, the release cannot bar her ADEA suit, irrespective of the validity of
the contract as to other claims").
'9524 U.S. 74 (1998).
20 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-68 (1994). COBRA amended the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994). Section
1161(a) is the general provision providing in pertinent part, "[t]he plan
sponsor of each group health plan shall provide, in accordance with this part,
that each qualified beneficiary who would lose coverage under the plan as a
result of a qualifying event is entitled, under the plan, to elect, within the
election period, continuation coverage under the plan." Id.
21 Geissel, 524 U.S. at 80-81.
2 id.
2 Id. at 86-87. The Court noted:
Once the beneficiary's pre-existing condition is identified, a
court need only look among the terms of the later policy for
an exclusion or limitation peculiar to that condition. If either
is found, COBRA continuation coverage is left undisturbed;
if neither is found, the consequence of obtaining this later
insurance is automatic.
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H. THE SUPREME COURT'S OCTOBER 1998 TERM
EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES
During the recently completed October 1998 Term, in Sutton
v. United Air Lines, 24 Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,25
and Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,26 the Court interpreted the

word "disabled," under the ADA, in an employer friendly
manner.
In Sutton, twin sisters with severe myopia applied for global
pilot positions with United Air Lines. 27 Their corrected vision
with eyeglasses was 20/20, but their applications were rejected
because of their uncorrected vision, and thus they filed ADA
complaints. 28 The Supreme Court concluded that they were not
disabled under the ADA. 29 Although they suffered from a
they were not
physical impairment, as required by the statute,
30
activity.
life
major
a
in
substantially limited
The key issue in Sutton was whether or not mitigating
measures, such as the use of corrective eyeglasses, must be
considered in determining if a person with a physical impairment
31
has suffered a substantial impairment of a major life activity.
Therefore, because the Sutton sisters had 20/20 vision with
eyeglasses, no major life activity was deemed to be impaired.32

24

527 U.S. 471 (1999).

2'527 U.S.516 (1999).
26
27

527 U.S. 555 (1999).
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475.

28

Id.

Id. at 478. The following definition of "disability" is set forth in the ADA:
"(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2)
(1990).
30 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482 (explaining that "if a person is taking measures to
correct for, or mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, the effects of those
measures - both positive and negative - must be taken into account when
judging whether that person is 'substantially limited' in a major life activity
and thus 'disabled' under the Act").
" Id.at 488.
29

32

id.

2000

SUPREME COURT DEVELOPMENTS

1247

This case is not troubling when dealing with the topic of
eyeglasses. However, it may be bothersome when dealing with
assistive or prosthetic devices, and essential medication for
physical or mental illness. It is an open question as to the extent
to which a person with a serious physical or mental impairment is
covered by the ADA, when the impairment may be mitigated in
some way.

The Court in Sutton rejected an EEOC Interpretive Guidance
and a Justice Department Guideline in concluding that mitigating
measures are to be considered when determining if an individual
with a physical or mental impairment suffered a substantial
limitation of a major life activity. 33 In doing so, the Court almost
certainly defined "disability" under the ADA more narrowly than
Congress would have expected. Justice Stevens, in his dissent,
wrote, "[t]he Committee Reports on the bill that became the
ADA made it abundantly clear that Congress intended the ADA
to cover individuals who could perform all of their major life
activities only with the help of ameliorative measures. ,"34
Additionally, Justice Breyer, in his dissent, identified the
choice made by the majority, as follows:
We must draw a statutory line that either (1) will include
within the category of persons authorized to bring suit
under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 some
whom Congress may not have wanted to protect (those
who wear ordinary eyeglasses), or (2) will exclude from
33 Id. at 480.

The EEOC Interpretive Guidance _provided that "[It]he
determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life
activity must be made on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating
measures such as medicines, or assitive or prosthetic devices." 29 C.F.R.
1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (1998). The Department of Justice guideline, also
rejected by the Court, provided: "The question of whether a person has a
disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating
measures, such as reasonable modification or auxiliary aids or services." 28
C.F.R. 35, app. A, § 35.104. Id.
34 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 499 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted
more specifically that, "[t]he Court appears to exclude from the Act's
protected class individuals with controllable conditions such as diabetes and
sever hypertension that were expressly understood as substantially limiting
impairments in the Act's Committee Reports .... " Id.
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the threshold category those whom Congress certainly
did want to protect (those who successfully use
corrective devices or medicines, such as hearing aids or
prostheses or medicine for epilepsy). Faced with this
dilemma, the statute's language, structure, basic
purposes, and history require us to choose the former
statutory line, as JUSTICE
STEVENS (whose opinion I
35
explains.
join) well
Sutton dealt with two additional ADA issues. First, it
rejected the claim that the Sutton sisters suffered a substantial
limitation in their major life activity of working. 36 Although they
did not receive the global pilot positions they sought, they were
not "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class
of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes... [t]he
inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute
a
37
working."
of
activity
life
major
the
in
substantial limitation
Second, the Court rejected the claim by the Sutton sisters
that they were regarded as being disabled. 38 The ADA prohibits
discrimination because an individual is "regarded as
having ...

an impairment [that substantially limits one or more

of the major life activities of such individual]." 3 9 The Court
relied upon the text of the statute in concluding that a disability
means that an individual is regarded by an employer as having a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits an
important life activity. 40 The Court noted that being viewed as
not meeting the specific physical requirements for a particular
job, as in Sutton, did not equal an automatic disability .4
35 Sutton, 527
36 Id.

U.S. at 513 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

at 482.

37 Id. at 491 (quoting from an EEOC regulation found at

29 CFR

§ 1630.20)(3)(i)).
38 Id. at 475 (holding that "petitioners failed to allege properly that respondent
'regarded' them as having a disability within the meaning of the ADA").
39 Id.
at 477-78 (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2) (1990)).
40 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.
41 Id. at 490. The Court stated:

2000

SUPREME COURT DEVELOPMEATS

1249

Therefore, it was found that the Sutton sisters were not
discriminated against because they were regarded as being
disabled. 42
Murphy involved a truck mechanic who was discharged by
the United Parcel Service because of a medically controlled high
blood pressure condition.43 As in Sutton, there was a physical
impairment, but not one that substantially limited a major life
activity."
The correction of the impairment, through
medication, prevented Murphy from being considered disabled
under the ADA. 45
Murphy was a replay of Sutton, with the exception that
Murphy's hypertension was a serious medical condition that
required control by medication. Like the sisters in Sutton, the
"Court concluded that Murphy was not disabled because his
medication permitted him to function in a normal way in his

[tihere is no dispute that petitioners are physically impaired.
Petitioners do not make the obvious argument that they are
regarded due to their impairments as substantially limited in
the major life activity of seeing. They contend only that
respondent mistakenly believes their physical impairments
substantially limit them in the major life activity of
working ... Further, this requirement substantially limits

their ability to engage in the major life activity of working by
precluding them from obtaining the job of global airline
pilot, which they argue is a 'class of employment.' In reply,
respondent argues that the position of global airline pilot is
not a class of jobs and therefore petitioners have not stated a
claim that they are regarded as substantially limited in the
major life activity of working.
Id.
42

id.

Murphy, 527 U.S. at 518. The Court noted that the petitioner was first
diagnosed with high blood pressure, i.e. hypertension, at the age of ten years
old. With medication, petitioner's "hypertension does not significantly restrict
his activities and.., in general he can function normally and can engage in
activities that other persons normally do." Id. (citing Murphy v. United
Parcel Service, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 872, 875 (Kan. 1996)).
44 Id. at 521 (noting that when the petitioner was medicated for his
hypertension condition, he did not experience a substantial limitation of any
major
life activity).
4
1Id.at 522.
41
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major life activities.46 He was not substantially impaired in the
major life activity of working, because he could work as a
mechanic in jobs that did not require him to drive a truck.47 This
was an essential part of his former job that required him to obtain
a U.S. Department of Transportation health certificate for
operation of commercial vehicles.48 Occasional driving of a
commercial truck was required by his previous mechanic
position, but would not be required for other mechanic
positions .4

In Albertsons,50 a truck driver was fired because he suffered
from amblyopia, causing monocular vision. The Court held that
mitigating measures must be taken into account in determining
whether he suffered from a disability under the ADA.51 In
addition, a determination that a person is disabled under the ADA
requires a case-by-case analysis. 52 In Albertsons, a possible
mitigating measure may have partially corrected the plaintiff's
amblyopia 3 Internal corrective adjustments within his brain
may have occurred, without medication, affecting the extent to
54
which he was substantially impaired in a major life activity.
The fact that Kirkingburg's visual acuity was different from that
46

47
48

1d. at 521.

Murphy, 527 U.S. at 522.
Id.

49 Id.

at 524. The Court held:
[t]he evidence that petitioner is regarded as unable to meet
DOT regulations is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether petitioner is regarded as unable to
perform a class of jobs utilizing his skills. At most,
petitioner has shown that he is regarded as unable to perform
the job of mechanic only when that job requires driving a
commercial motor vehicle - a specific type of vehicle used
on a highway in interstate commerce.

Id.
'0 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
51 Albertsons, 527 U.S. at 566.
52 Id.
53 Id.

54 Id. The Court stated that Kirkingburg's "brain has developed subconscious
mechanisms for coping with [his] visual impairment and thus his body
compensates for his disability." Id.
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of other people didn't necessarily mean that he was substantially
impaired in the major life activity of seeing. 55
In Kolstad v. American Dental Association,56 the Court
57

resolved the split among the circuit courts of appeals
concerning the standard for awards of punitive damages in Title
VII actions, but provided employers with a good faith compliance
defense against punitive
damages awards based upon action taken
58
by managerial agents.
Punitive damages became available under Title VII for
59
intentional discrimination through the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
following proof that a defendant acted "with malice or with
reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an
aggrieved individual." 60
In Kolstad, a sex discrimination
promotion case, the Court rejected the lower court's "egregious
misconduct" standard. 6 ' Instead, the plaintiff must prove that the
employer's intentional discrimination occurred "with malice or
reckless indifference to the [plaintiff's] federally protected
5- Id.
at

567.
56 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
Petitioner alleged that respondent's decision to
promote her co-worker instead of petitioner, was an act of employment
discrimination based on gender, which is proscribed under Title VII. In
addition, the petitioner also introduced testimony at trial that Wheat (the hiring
supervisor) told sexually offensive jokes and used derogatory terms to refer to
some professional women. Id. at 531.
57 Koistad, 527 U.S. at 533. Compare the lower court decision in Kolstad,
139 F.3d 965 (D.C. 1998), with Luciana v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 219220 (Cal.2d 1997) (rejecting contention that punitive damages require showing
of "extraordinary egregious" conduct).
58 Id. at 544. Good faith efforts at Title VII compliance require the employer
to "demonstrate that it never acted in reckless disregard of federally protected
rights." For instance, in some cases, the existence of a written policy
instituted in good faith has operated as a total bar to employer liability to
punitive damages. Id.
'942 U.S.C. § 1981.
60 42 U.S.C. § 198a(b)(1) (1991). See Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 533.
61 Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 533. "A defendant must be shown to have engaged in
some "egregious" misconduct before the jury is permitted to consider a
request for punitive damages." The Court relied upon the structure of § 1981a
to prove that Congress intended to limit punitive damages to exceptional cases.
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rights.",62 The Court explained that "[t]he terms 'malice' or
'reckless indifference' pertain to the employer's knowledge that it
may be acting in violation of federal law, not its awareness that it
is engaging in discrimination." 63 The employer "must at least
discriminate in the face of a perceived risk that its 64actions will
violate federal law to be liable in punitive damages."
In Kolstad, the Court also held that an employer is not
vicariously liable for punitive damages based upon decisions of
management agents "where these decisions are contrary to the
employer's 'good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII.'"65 This
vague good faith standard, presumably part of the plaintiff's
burden of proof, will limit the situations in which punitive
damages will be awarded.
The Court limited the availability of the employer defense of
judicial estoppel in ADA actions in Cleveland v. Policy
Management Systems Corporation.66 Carolyn Cleveland was

terminated from her job after she suffered a stroke.67 She
subsequently applied for and received Social Security Disability
Insurance (SSDI) benefits. 68 She then sued her former employer
under the ADA for disability discrimination on the theory that
she could perform the essential functions of her job with
reasonable accommodation. 69 The district court and court of
appeals held that she was judicially estopped from pursuing her
ADA claim because of her SSDI disability claim.7 °
621 d. at

63 Id.
64 Id.

534.

at 536.

Id. at 545 (quoting Judge Tatel's dissent in the court of appeals decision
below, in Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 139 F.3d 965, 974 (Tatel,
J., dissenting) (1998)). The Restatement of Agency's "scope of employment"
rule regarding Title VII punitive damages would reduce the incentive for
employers to implement antidiscrimination programs. It would, in effect,
penalize those employers who take the time to educate themselves and their
employees on Title VII. Id.
526 U.S. 795 (1999).
67 Id. at 798.
65

68 id.

Id. at 799.
Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 195 F.3d 803 (5th Cir.
1999).

69

70
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The Supreme Court disagreed, and held that seemingly
inconsistent claims may be made for SSDI benefits under the

Social Security Act and for disability discrimination under the
ADA, because the two statutes have different purposes and
definitions of disability. 7 1

The ADA contains a reasonable

accommodation 72

requirement that is inapplicable to SSDI
disability determinations,7' which is a fact that is important to
this action. Therefore, a person could be disabled for SSDI
purposes because the applicable test is the ability to work,
without consideration of reasonable accommodation, and at the
same time that person could be a "qualified individual with a
the essential
disability" 74 under the ADA, able to "perform
75
"
....
position
employment
the
of
functions
However, a plaintiff who makes an SSDI contention that she
is disabled and subsequently files an ADA claim "must explain
why that SSDI contention is consistent with the ADA claim that
she could 'perform the essential functions' of her previous job, at
least with 'reasonable accommodation.'" 76 The Court held that

"an ADA plaintiff cannot simply ignore the apparent
contradiction that arises out of the earlier SSDI total disability
77
claim. Rather, she must proffer a sufficient explanation. "

71Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 802.

Id. at 803. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (9)(B), which states in pertinent part:
"reasonable accommodations may include: job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications
of examinations... and other similar accommodations." Id.
73 Id. The SSA receives more than 2.5 million claims for disability benefits
yearly, since its budget is limited, the SSA does not have the resources to
make the fact-specific inquiry into the matter of "reasonable
accommodations." Id.
The Act defines "qualified individual with a
74 42 U.S.C. § 1211(8).
disability" as a disabled person "who... can perform the essential functions"
of her job, including those who can do so only "with ...reasonable
accommodation." Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 801.
at 803-04.
75
76 Cleveland, 526 U.S.
Id.at 795.
'n Id. at 806.
72
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In Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. v. Carmichael,78 the Court
gave federal trial courts additional discretion to exclude expert
witness testimony in employment cases. In Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 79 a 1993 case dealing with scientific
expert testimony, the Supreme Court confirmed the authority of
federal district court judges to exclude expert witness testimony
on the grounds of relevance and reliability. In Kumho, a
products liability action from the October 1998 Term, the Court
made it clear that the "gatekeeping function, 80 of the trial judge
extends beyond scientific testimony to all expert witness, which
increases the likelihood of exclusion of expert witness testimony
in employment cases. 81 In determining if expert witness
testimony is to be allowed, a "trial court may consider one or
when
more of the more specific factors that Daubert mentioned
82
doing so will help determine the testimony's reliability."
One lesson that the plaintiff's counsel learned from Kumho
about employment law cases is that great care must be taken in
selecting expert witnesses, especially when expert witness
testimony is central to the proof of a case, because a case can be
lost at the summary judgment stage if the trial judge relies upon
Kumho and excludes the testimony of a crucial expert witness.
In West v. Gibson,83 the Court approved EEOC authority to
provide federal employees with compensatory damages at the
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
'9509 U.S. 579 (1993).
80 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141. The main purpose of the "gatekeeping function"
is to "ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony [and] to make
certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or
personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual
rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field." Id. at
151. See also FED. R. EVID. 702 (stating "if scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise").
81 Id. at 152.
78

82

id.

527 U.S. 212 (1999). Gibson, the respondent, filed a complaint with the
Department of Veterans Affairs alleging that the Department had discriminated
83
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administrative stage. Title VII, as amended in 1972, authorizes
the EEOC to provide "appropriate remedies" for employment
discrimination against federal government employees. 8 4 As
amended by the Compensatory Damages Amendment Act of
1991,85 Title VII provides for awards of compensatory damages

for victims of intentional discrimination, including victims who
are employees of the federal government. In West, the Court
described EEOC's administrative processing of federal employee
charges as a "dispute resolution system"8 6 that provides
"administrative relief prior to court action," 8 7 and concluded
"[t]o deny that an EEOC compensatory damages award is,
statutorily speaking, 'appropriate' would undermine this remedial
scheme."

88

8 9 involved
Wright v. Universal Maritime Senice Corporation
binding arbitration of statutory employment discrimination claims
of union members. However, the decision offered limited
guidance in a very complex area. In a unanimous opinion written
by Justice Scalia, the Court considered the enforceability of a
binding arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement, as

applied to statutory employment discrimination claims. 90

The

clause covered "... . all matters affecting wages, hours, and other
against him because it denied him a promotion on the basis of his gender. Id.
at 216.
'4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b).
"' 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1991). The statute states in pertinent part: "In an
action brought by a complaining party under section... 717 [dealing with
discrimination by the Federal Government] against a respondent who engaged
in unlawful intentional discrimination ...the complaining party may recover
" Id.
compensatory... damages ....
S6 Vest, 527 U.S. at 218. The purpose of the administrative process is to
initially avoid the court, which will provide federal employees with quicker,
less formal and cheaper resolution of disputes. If a party disagrees with the
final disposition rendered by the agency, then a court would be an appropriate
venue
for the dispute. Id. at 219.
8
7 Id.at 218-19.
88 Id. at 219. Sponsors of the CDA stated that there was a need to create a
new remedy that would potentially make victims whole and provide additional
deterrence to intentional discrimination. Id.
"9525 U.S. 70 (1998).
90 Id.
at 72.
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terms and conditions of employment .
,,91 The decision
acknowledged that there is "some tension" 92 between Alexander
v. Garder-Denver,93 holding that a binding arbitration clause in a
collective bargaining agreement does not prevent a union member
from filing a Title VII action, and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Cop. ,94 a non-union case, in which an ADEA claim was
subject to binding arbitration pursuant to a New York Stock
Exchange rule. 95 In Gilmer, the Court held that, 96
"statutory
claims may be the sfibject of an arbitration agreement."
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Wright left open the
question of whether or not a union member may be forced to
submit statutory *employment discrimination claims to binding
arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement. On the facts
of Wright, the binding arbitration clause in the collective
bargaining agreement did not bind the union members because
there was no "clear and unmistakable waiver" 97 of the right to a
judicial forum. 98
However, that did not necessarily mean that the binding
arbitration clause would have been effective had there been a
clear and unmistakable waiver because the Court also wrote,
"[w]e do not reach the question whether such a waiver would be
enforceable." ' 9 The Wright decision did not address the
troublesome issue of the legality of binding arbitration clauses
that are forced upon non-union employees as part of employment
contracts that employees must sign to obtain or keep their jobs.

91

Id. at 73.

Id. at 76. The apparent tension between the two cases is that GardnerDenver stated that "an employee's rights under Title VII are not susceptible of
prospective waiver," while Gilmer held that the right to a federal judicial
forum for an ADEA claim could be waived. Id. at 76-77.
9' 415 U.S. 36, 40 (1974).
92

94

500 U.S. 20 (1991).

95 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
96 Id.

97 Wright, 525
98 Id. at 82.
99 Id.

U.S. at 81.
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Basic principles, of federalism 0 0 were modified during the
October 1998 Term by three Eleventh Amendment' 0' sovereign
immunity cases.

One of these cases was Alden v. Maine, 0 2 in

which the court held unconstitutional a provision of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA")103 that subjected states to
suit in state court for violation of FLSA overtime provisions.10
These federalism cases led to the extremely important ADEA
case, Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 10 5 where the court held
that the ADEA is unconstitutional as applied to state government
defendants. Kimel and the three sovereign immunity cases from
the October 1998 Term are discussed in Part HI below. Also
discussed in Part III is Reeves v. Sanderson,10 6 a pending case

with potentially dramatic significance for proof of the disparate
treatment of cases under the ADEA and Title VII.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S MOST IMPORTANT
OCTOBER 1999 TERM EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES KIMEL AND REEVES
In its October 1999 term, the Supreme Court decided two
important employment law. cases: Kinzel v. Florida Board of
Regents'0 7 and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing. 0 8 In Kimel,

following its recent decisions limiting congressional power over
1m Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999). "Federalism requires that
Congress treat the States in a manner consistent with their status as residuary
sovereigns and joint participants in the governance of the Nation." Id.
'o'U.S. CONST. amend. XI, states in pertinent part: "The Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Id.
102 527 U.S. 706.
103 29 U.S.C. §§ 201r219 (1938).
'04 Alden, 527 U.S. 706.
The other two cases are Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S.
627 (1999), and College Savings Bank v. Florida Postsecondary Education
Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
105 120 S.Ct. 631 (2000).
106

120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000).

528 U.S. 62, 145 L. Ed. 2d 522 (2000).
10' 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000).

107
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States, the Court held that Congress lacked power under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment' °9 to make States subject to suits
for violations of the ADEA. In Reeves, the court clarified the
question of the framework of proof in disparate treatment cases
in a decision that plaintiff's employment lawyers would likely
find beneficial.
A.
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents and State Immunity
from Federal Civil Rights Statutes
Kimel raised the question of whether the Eleventh
Amendment, 110 which shields unconsenting states from suits by
their own citizens and citizens of other states, prohibited

Congress from making States subject to suit pursuant to the
ADEA. 11 1 Congress has the power to abrogate States' sovereign
immunity from suit if, (1) the statute clearly expresses Congress'

intent to abrogate States' immunity, and (2) if Congress is acting
pursuant to a constitutional provision which grants it the power to
abrogate the immunity.1 2 The majority of the courts of appeal
had found that the States were not immune from suit under the
ADEA, 113 but a divided panel of the Eleventh circuit in Kimel
had sustained the state agency's claim of immunity.' 1 4 A sharply
109 U.S.CoNST. amend XIV, §5 states in pertinent part: "The Congress shall
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article." Id.
1"0 U.S. CONST. amend XI, which provides: "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Id.
t" See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
112 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996).
113 See, e.g., Cooper v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 162 F.3d
770 (2d Cir. 1998); Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 1998);
Coger v. Board of Regents of the State of Tenn., 154 F.3d 296 (6th Cir.
1998); Keeton v. University of Nev. System, 150 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 1998);
Scott v. University of Miss., 148 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 1998); Goshtasby v.
Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 141 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1998).
114 See Kimel v. Florida, 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998); see also
Humenansky v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 1998)
(finding state agency immune from suit in federal court under the ADEA).
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divided Supreme Court went the way of the minority of the
Circuits, holding that although Congress had made its intent to
abrogate States' immunity as to the ADEA unmistakably clear,
Congress did not have the power to do so.
The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual... because of such
individual's age."1 5 When enacted in 1967, the ADEA applied
only to private employers, 1 6 but in 1974 when Congress
amended the Fair Labor Standards Act, Congress extended the
ADEA to the States by expanding the definition of employer
contained in 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) to cover states and their7
agencies, instrumentalities and political subdivisions."1
Congress also amended the FLSA enforcement provision, 29
U.S.C. § 216(b), which is incorporated by reference into the
ADEA" 8 and permits individuals to bring a civil action against
"any employer (including a public agency)" in Federal or State
court.11 9 Elsewhere in the statute, "public agency" was
specifically defined to include states and their agencies, and
political subdivisions.120 These provisions, the Court found, were
sufficient to satisfy the requirement that immunity be
"unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." 121
However, the Kimel Court found that the ADEA had failed
the second prong of the Eleventh Amendment inquiry, finding
that Congress lacked power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to enact the ADEA. This holding was, for the most
11529

U.S.C. § 623 (a)(1)(2000).

See 29 U.S.C. § 6 06(b)(164 ed., supp. III).
117 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974 (1974 Act) §28, 88 Stat. 74.
"" 88 Stat. 61.
19 29 U.S.C. §216 (b) (2000).
120 29 U.S.C. §203 (x) (2000).
121Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 536
(quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989)) (in turn quoting
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)) (internal
quotations omitted). Only Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Kennedy,
disagreed with this portion of the opinion, arguing that the "sequence of
events" surrounding the enactment of the FLSA amendments made it less than
clear that Congress understood the effect of these changes on the ADEA. See
145 L. Ed. 2d at 552 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116
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part, an outgrowth of the Court's landmark decision in Seminole
Tribe of Florida v Florida,122 in which the Court held, by a

narrow majority, that Congress cannot abrogates States'
immunity when acting pursuant to the Commerce clause and can
only do so when passing legislation pursuant to the post-Civil
War Amendments - the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and the
Fifteenth. 123 While the Court had already found in EEOC v.
Wyoming 124 that the ADEA was a valid exercise of Congress'
power under the Commerce Clause, after Seminole Tribe, in
order to pass the second prong of the Eleventh Amendment
inquiry, the ADEA must also have been a proper exercise of
Congress' power pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
'23 See id. at 66-67. At issue in Seminole Tribe was whether Congress had
properly waived States' sovereign immunity as to the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act, a statute enacted pursuant to Congress' power under the
Indian Commerce Clause, Art.I §8 c.3, which allowed resident Indian Tribes
seeking to conduct certain gambling activities to bring suit where a state
refused to negotiate in good faith. The Court agreed with Florida's claim that
the Eleventh Amendment barred the Indian Tribe from bringing suit in federal
court, finding that though the first prong of the Eleventh Amendment inquiry
had been satisfied, the second prong had not. According to the Court, where
Congress is acting pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause it does not have
power to abrogate States' immunity. In so concluding, the Court partially
overruled is opinion in Pennsylvannia v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989), in
which a plurality of the Court had found thatthe Interstate Commerce Clause
granted Congress power to abrogate State sovereign immunity. According to
the Court, the rationale of the Union Gas plurality "deviated sharply from our
established federalism jurisprudence." Because the Commerce Clause, as part
of Article I,was enacted prior to the Eleventh Amendment, it could not
expand the Article III jurisdiction that the Eleventh Amendment was enacted to
limit. The Court contrasted, however, statutes enacted pursuant to Congress'
power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to "enforce, by appropriate
legislation" § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to fundamentally alter the relationship between the
federal government and the States, that Amendment gave Congress authority
to abrogate States' immunity. So while the Court partially overruled Union
Gas, it specifically reaffirmed its prior holding in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445 (1976), that Congress, in making Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act applicable to the States in the 1972 amendments to the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, had validly abrogated States' constitutional immunity.
124 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
122
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Amendment, that is the power to enforce the substantive

provision of
the Fourteenth Amendment "by appropriate
1 25
legislation."
As the Supreme Court made clear in several recent nonemployment cases, City of Boerne v. Flores'26 and Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank, 27 Congress' enforcement power under the Equal
Protection Clauses was "broad... [but] not unlimited." 28
While Congress' Section 5 power goes beyond merely providing

a cause of action for unconstitutional conduct and allows
Congress the power to enact measures aimed at preventing the
occurrence of future unconstitutional conduct, the Court in
Boerne129 and Florida Prepaid,130 had found the statues at issue
460 U.S. at 243.
U.S. 507 (1997).
127 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
128Boerne, 138 L. Ed. 2d at 647 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
128 (1970) (Black., J., dissenting)); see also Florida Prepaid v. College
Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636 (1999).
129In Boerne, the Court held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000b et. seq., (RFRA) was an invalid exercise of the Section 5
power. See 138 L. Ed. 2d at 649. RFRA had been adopted in an attempt to
deny effect to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment Free
Exercise Clause in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In
finding RFRA constitutionally defective, the Court emphasized that it had been
adopted in open defiance of Supreme Court pronouncements, and that its aim
and scope were disproportionate to the harm that it sought to remedy. Id. at
64647. According to the Court, RFRA - unlike prior legislation upheld by
the Court that prohibited conduct not itself constitutional - was "so out of
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive objective that it cannot be
understood as responsive to or designed to prevent unconstitutional behavior"
and instead "appears... to attempt a substantive change in constitutional
protections." Id. at 646. The Court found little evidence in the legislative
record of unconstitutional conduct by States, and RFRA's scope was so vast, it
"intrude[ed] at every level of government displacing laws and prohibiting
official conduct of almost every description," that it could not fairly be said to
be aimed at unconstitutional conduct. Id.
130 In Florida Prepaid, the Court found that the Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Patent Remedy Act), 35 U.S.C.
§§ 271(h), 296(a), was an inappropriate Section 5 measure as applied to
States. See 144 L. Ed. 2d at 593. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist held that Congress had failed to identify a pattern of patent
125

126521
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The principle set out in

Boerne, and followed in Florida Prepaid, was that Congress
could act to remedy or prevent constitutional conduct, but that

this remedial or prophylactic aim must be congruent and
proportional with the means or methods authorized by the statute.
Applying Boerne here, the Court found first that the ADEA
proscribed "very little" conduct that was, in fact,
unconstitutional.13 ' Prior Court case law had made clear that
age-based classifications, unlike those based on race and gender,
32
are only unconstitutional where they lack any rational basis.'
Further, the Court has never found a classification on the basis of
age to violated the Equal Protection Clause. 133 Whereas prior
case law had permitted States to make age-based classifications
(even those based on inaccurate generalizations) where such
classifications had a "rational basis," the ADEA placed a "broad
restriction on the use of age as a discriminating factor, [thus]
prohibit[ing] substantially more state employment decisions and
infringement by the States, and that the Act's provisions were so out of
proportion to any supposed remedial or prophylactic object that they could not
be understood as responsive to or designed to prevent unconstitutional
behavior. Accepting that patents were "property," the Court explained that
infringement of such property could only violate the Fourteenth Amendment if
such infringement was done without due process, i.e. in the absence of an
adequate state remedy, and if the infringement was done willfully. Because
the legislative record had failed to consider the availability of state remedies
for patent infringement, and because the statue did not limit infringement
actions to those that were intentional, the Act could not be said to "respond to
a history of widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights."
Id. at 592.
'3 Kimel, 145 L. Ed. 2d. at 545 (2000).
132 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per
curiam). The Murgia Court rejected claims that age should be a suspect class,
explaining that older individuals are not a "discrete and insular minority"
(everyone who lives a normal life gets old, the Court reasoned), and that older
people have not been subject to a history of intentional discrimination. Id. at
313.
133 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (upholding provision of
Missouri Constitution requiring judges to retire at age 70); Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 93 (1973) (upholding federal statue requiring Foreign Service
officers to retire at age 60); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 317 (upholding
Massachusetts statutes requiring state police officers to retire at age 50).

2000

SUPREME COURTDEVELOPMENTS

1263

practices than would likely be held unconstitutional under the
applicable equal protection, rational basis standard." 134 The
Court found that petitioners' argument that limitations in the
statute made it less broad and more in line with the prohibitions
of the Equal Protection Clause was unconvincing. 13 ' As to the

Act's "BFOQ" defense provision, which permitted employers to
rely on age when it is a "bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular
business," 136 the Court relied on its holding in Western Air Lines,
Inc. v. Criswell,137 that the BFOQ defense incorporates the
"reasonableness" standard contained in the rational basis test.'38
The Court rejected a similar argument involving another
provision of the ADEA, section 623(f), 139 which "allows

employers to engage in conduct otherwise prohibited by the Act
'where the differentiation is based on a reasonable factor other
than age." 140 The Court found that this exception actually
reinforced the notion that the ADEA extended further than the
constitution, by making clear that an employer could not rely on
age as a proxy for other characteristics which the constitution, in
contrast, permits.141
'34
35 145

L. Ed. 2d. at 544.

136 See

id. at 544-45 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(1)).

1 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529.
137 472 U.S. 400 (1985).

145 L. Ed. 2d. at 545. In Western Air Lines, 472 U.S. 400 (1985), the
Court explained that the BFOQ defense was a very narrow exception to the
ADEA's general prohibition of age discrimination, and that to properly invoke
a BFOQ defense an employer must show that "all or nearly all employees
above an age lack the qualifications required for the position" or that the age
classification was necessary because "it is highly impractical for the employer
to insure by individual testing that its employees will have the necessary
qualifications for the job." 472 U.S. at 422-23. Accordingly, the Kimel
Court concluded that "although it is true that the existence of the BFOQ
defense makes the ADEA's prohibition of age discrimination less than
absolute, the Act's substantive requirements nevertheless remain at a level
akin to our heightened scrutiny cases under the Equal Protection Clause."
Kinel, 145 L. Ed. 2d. at 545.
13929 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2000).
140 Kimnel, 145 L. Ed. 2d. at 545.
141 Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623 (f)(1)(2000)).
131
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The Court's conclusion that the ADEA extended further than
the constitution did not, however, end the Court's Section 5
inquiry. Congress may enact legislation that goes further than
what the Constitution prohibits if such legislation is reasonably
designed to prevent or remedy unconstitutional conduct. Relying
on the analysis delineated in Boerne and Florida Prepaid, the
Court examined the legislative record to determine the
appropriateness of the ADEA, given the extent of the
unconstitutional conduct, and found it lacking. According to the
Court, "Congress never identified any pattern of age
discrimination by the States, much less any discrimination
' 42
whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional violation.'
The record did contain several passages suggesting that age
discrimination was broadly practiced in government
employment;1 43 however, the Court characterized these as mere
"isolated sentences clipped from floor debates and legislative
reports." 144 The Court also dismissed petitioner's argument that
the legislative history was sufficient because Congress had relied
on a 1966 report from California regarding age discrimination in
public employment in that state. 145 According to the Court, this
report addressed primarily age discrimination in law enforcement
and fire-fighting which, according to the Court's precedents,
were not unconstitutional conduct and, further, evidence of
discrimination in a single state could not support a finding that
unconstitutional age discrimination "had become a problem of a
national import." 14 6 Lastly, the Court rejected the argument,
advanced by the United States, that Congress' extensive findings

Kimel, 145 L. Ed. 2d. at 530.
Id. (citing 118 Cong. Rec. 24397 (1992)). "[T]here is ample evidence that
age discrimination is broadly practiced in government employment." Id. at
7745; "Letters from my own State have revealed that State and local
governments have also been guilty of discrimination toward older employees."
Id.; "Where are strong indications that the hiring and firing practices of
142
143

governmental units discriminate against the elderly. . .
144 Kimel, 145 L. Ed. 2d. at 546.
141Id.
146

."

Id.

at 546-47.

Id. at 547 (quoting Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank, 144 L. Ed.

2d. 575 (1999)).
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of age discrimination in the private sector could support its
application of the ADEA to the States.
The dissenters in this case, the same four that had dissented
in every Eleventh Amendment case since Seminole, blasted the
majority's opinion. The dissenters, in an opinion written by
Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, announced their refusal to follow the restrictions on
Congress' abrogation power spawned by Seminole, and asserted
their continued belief that the decision in Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas remained good law. The dissenters termed the Court's
recent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, "such a radical
departure from the proper role of this Court that it should be
opposed whenever the opportunity arises." 147 The dissent faulted
the majority for placing the Judicial Branch in the position of
"constitutional guardian" of states sovereignty. 148 According to
Justice Stevens, the constitutional system of equal representation
in the Senate, and not the court, "provides the principal structural
protection for the sovereignty of the several States. " 149 In
passing a statute, Congress "does so against the background of
state law already in place; the propriety of taking national action
is thus measured by the metric of the existing state norms that
Congress seeks to supplement or supplant."' 50 Given this
structure, and given the fact that the only textual limitation of
sovereign immunity is on the "diversity jurisdiction of the federal
courts," the dissent argued, the Court should not take it upon
itself to substitute its views of federalism for those of
5
Congress.1 1
After Kimel, it is not clear that Congress could reenact the
ADEA so as to enable private litigants to bring an action against
the States. The court not only demands a showing of a
"widespread" pattern of unconstitutional conduct by States, 5 2 but
1471

d. at 552 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1 Id. at 548.
4
48

19

Id. at 549.
150 Id.
"' Id. at 550.

Florida Prepaid, 144 L. Ed. 2d at 592 (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526);
Kimel, 145 L. Ed. 2d. at 546-47.
152
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also shows no serious willingness to defer to Congress' judgment
as to whether such a pattern exists. 153 Given the presumption
often repeated in Kimel, that age discrimination is presumably
constitutional, it is hard to imagine how Congress could compile
a sufficient legislative record regarding a patter of
"unconstitutional" conduct by States to survive this Court's
review.
The existence of state-based remedies for age
discrimination in employment in almost every state (most of
which were not in existence when Congress extended the ADEA
to States in 1974) makes it additionally unlikely that the Court
would uphold a new provision without some finding that these
state remedies are inadequate.
The Kimel decision also casts into immediate doubt the
ability of private litigants to bring suit under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, a question on which the Court has recently
granted certiorari. There is a lopsided split on the question, with
most circuits finding that Congress has the power to abrogated
States' immunity, and the Court has taken certiorari on a case
raising the issue for the October 2000 term. 5 4 The ADA
contains a clear statement of abrogation of States' immunity, 155
but like the ADEA, the terms of the ADA require employers to
provide "reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability" ,156 and prohibits conduct that is not prohibited by the
Constitution itself. There are, nonetheless, strong reasons to
suggest that, notwithstanding its decision in Kimel, the Court may
find that Congress validly abrogates States immunity as to the
ADA.

...
See Kimel, 145 L. Ed. 2d. at 546-47 (scrutinizing legislative record and
finding it insufficient).
l'4 See Garrett v. University of Alabama, 193 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1999),
cert. granted, 146 L. Ed. 2d 479 (2000).
...
42 U.S.C. 12202 provides that a "State shall not be immune under the
eleventh amendment to the constitution of the United States for an action in [a]
Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this
chapter."
156 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (b)(5)(A)(2000).
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For one, the Court in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne,157
unanimously found unconstitutional a decision by a city to deny a
special use permit for the operation of a group home for people
with mental retardation.
While the court stated that all
classifications on the basis of disability would not be deemed
"quasi suspect," the Court found that "there have been and there
will continue to be instances of discrimination against the
retarded that are in fact invidious, and that are properly subject to
judicial correction under constitutional norms.""'8 Unlike with
the ADEA where the Court, having found no constitutional
violations in three challenges to age classifications, seemed to
suggest that age classifications would rarely ever be found
unconstitutional; given Cleburne, there is a stronger argument
that the ADA reaches at least some unconstitutional conduct.
Additionally, the ADA contains an extensive legislative
history on the need to remedy discrimination against people with
disabilities. The statute makes explicit findings regarding the
problems faced by people with disabilities, including that they
were subject to continuing "serious and pervasive" discrimination
that "tended to isolate and segregate individuals with
disabilities." 59 The legislative reports, floor statements and the
hearings on the ADA, as well as a report of the United States
Commission on Civil Rights that was before Congress, 60
specifically document the segregation of people with disabilities
in "critical areas [such] as employment, housing, public
accommodations, education, transportation, communication,
recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access
to public services,"' 6' the exclusion of people with disabilities
157 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985).
158 Id. at 446.

59 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(2). The first section of the statute details Congress'
findings as to the problems and discrimination faced by people with
disabilities, see § 12101(a)-(g), as well as Congress' "invo[cation]" of "the
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment... in order to remedy the major
areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities." Id. at

§ 12101(b)(4).
'6 See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE
SPEcrRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILrrIEs 23-26 (1983).
161 S. REp. No. 116, 102d Cong., 1' Sess. 11 (1989).
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162
from public accommodations, including government buildings,
the inaccessibility of state-run accommodations such as public
streets, sidewalks and public transportation, 163 and the poverty
and segregation caused both by lack of access to transportation
for people with disabilities,' 64 and by the direct discrimination in
employment against persons with disabilities. 165 Faced with a
legislative record more extensive than the one at issue in Kimel,
the Court may find the ADA is a proportional response.
Further, the standard that the ADA places on States is
arguably less onerous, particularly in light of the Court's own
willingness to strike down the disability-based classifications in
Cleburne, than that at issue in the ADEA. Because the statute

does not require States, and covered entities, to undertake actions

that "requir[e] significant difficulty or expense" in light of the
166
State's "overall financial resources" and "type of operation,"'
it is arguably less taxing on States than the ADEA's prohibition
of non-job related age classifications. Still, because a majority of
the Supreme Court has shown itself highly skeptical of Congress'
power to proscribe conduct involving non-suspect classes, the
Court may find even the ADA's substantial legislative record
insufficient to satisfy the standards applied in the most recent
Eleventh Amendment cases.
Finally, it is worth noting that the Court's sovereign
immunity decisions have implications for other employment
162 135 CONG. REc. 8, 712 (1989) (remarks of Rep. Coelho).
163 H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1990); AMERICANS

WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1989:
SUBCOMM.

HEARING ON H.R. 2273 BEFORE THE

ON CIVIL & CONST. RIGHTS OF THE HOUSE COMM.

ON THE

JUDICIARY, 10s Cong., 1' Sess. 248, 271 (1989).

'64 H.R. REP. No. 483 pt. 4, 101St Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1990) ("Transportation
plays a central role in the lives of all Americans. It is a veritable lifeline to
the economic and social benefits that our Nation offers its citizens. The
absence of effective access to the transportation network can mean, in turn,
the inability to obtain satisfactory employment. It can also mean the inability
to take full advantage of the services and other opportunities provided by both
the public and private sectors").
165 See, e.g, Senate Report, supra note 153; House Report, supra note 143;
see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5).
'66

42 U. S. C. §12112 (b)(5)(A); id. §12111 (10).
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statutes, most particularly the Equal Pay Act, 167 which prohibits
sex-based wage differentials, and the Family Medical Leave Act
of 1993,168 which grants employees the right to unpaid leave to
care for family members. While both statutes further the
elimination of gender-based discrimination in employment,
particularly true for the Equal Pay Act, they both reach conduct
that goes beyond the intentional discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution. Somewhat less at risk is Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.169 State defendants have crafted arguments
suggesting that Congress has failed to abrogate States' immunity
for claims brought under Title VII disparate impact theoryestablished in Griggs v. Duke Power170 and codified at 42 U.S.C.
§2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(I) - which reaches conduct that the
Constitution itself does not prohibit. 71 However, the only circuit
to have addressed the issue is the Eleventh Circuit in In re
Employment Discrimination Litigation172 which rejected this
challenge. The court held that the Supreme Court's decision in
Fitzpatrickv. Bitzer173 foreclosed the argument that Congress had
not expressed its intent to abrogate States' immunity.174 As to
the second prong, the Reynolds court found that the substantial
overlap between the Title VII disparate impact standard of proof
and the proof required to establish intentional discrimination (see
infra for discussion of disparate treatment standard), meant that
75
Title VII easily satisfied Boenze's proportionality test.
Moreover, the court noted the existence of an extensive
congressional record documenting the problem of race
discrimination in public employment and the need to address
unintentional discrimination in employment to avoid perpetuating
past discrimination and discrimination in other sectors. 17,
167 29 U.S.C. §206(d).
16829 U.S.C. §2601 et seq.
169 42 U.S.C. §2000e.
170 401 U.S. 424 (1971).

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
198 F.3d 1305 (111h Cir. 1999).
173 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
'74 In re Employment DiscriminationLitigation,198 F.3d at 1317.
'7 5 Id. at 1322-23.
171See

172

'76Id.at

1323.
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Finally, it is now clear that the Eleventh Amendment bar on
suits against States under the ADEA cannot be circumvented by
bringing a suit in state court. It had generally been assumed that
the Eleventh Amendment immunity bar applied only to suits
brought in federal court, 1 7 7 and thus that presumably, where an
act remains a valid exercise of Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause, such as in the case of the ADEA, one could
bring an action against a state in state court. However, in the
October 1998 term, in Alden v. Maine,17 8 the Court held that
while the Eleventh Amendment by its terms applied only in
federal court, because sovereign immunity is a fundamental
aspect of the sovereignty which the "States enjoyed before the
ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today," this
immunity applied also in state courts. 179 Alden arose in the
context of a challenge by a group of probation officers against
their employer for violation of the overtime provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"). 180 The officers had
originally brought the case in the United States District Court of
Maine, but, while the suit was pending, the Court decided
Seminole Tribe. Since the FLSA was adopted pursuant to
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause, the district court
dismissed the case.'18 The officers then refiled the action in state
court. The state trial court dismissed the suit on the grounds of
sovereign 8 2immunity, and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
affirmed. 1
With the same narrow majority that has prevailed in all the
recent Eleventh Amendment cases, the Court held in Alden v.
Maine that Congress did not have power under Article I to
subject non-consenting States to private suits in their own
courts. 183 The Court went beyond the face of the plain language
of the Eleventh Amendment, holding that state sovereign
177

See,

e.g.,

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION

(1994) (citing Nevada v. Hall as support for this proposition).
178 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
179 id. at 713.
Iso 52 Stat. 1060, as amended 29 U.S.C. §201 et seq.
81Alden, 527 U.S. at 712.
182 Id.
183 Id.

§ 7.4, at 385
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immunity is not limited to the text of the Eleventh Amendment,
but "inheres in the system of federalism established by the
Constitution. "184 Moreover, nothing in the Necessary and Proper
Clause, according to the majority, gave Congress the "incidental
authority to subject the States to private suits as means of
achieving objectives otherwise within the scope of the
enumerated powers."' 85 Looking at the historical record, the
Court concluded that while the constitutional debates were silent
to the issue of state immunity from suit in state court, this was
because this immunity was "so well-established that no one
conceived it would be altered by the new Constitution." 1 86 The
language of the Eleventh Amendment explicitly addressed only
federal court immunity because it was only that immunity that
was called into question by Article ][i. t8 7 The Court also found
support for its understanding of sovereign immunity in isolated
statements in prior Court opinions that referred to sovereign
immunity broadly, (without delineating whether that immunity
was limited to state and federal courts), and that referred to
States' immunity from private suits in their own courts. 8 8
Finally, the Court explained that sovereign immunity in state
courts was consistent with the constitutional design, which,
though granting broad powers to Congress, still requires that the
States retain their status as "residuary sovereigns and joint
participants in the governance of the Nation." 8 9 In the Court's
view, limiting sovereign immunity only to federal courts would
not properly respect the status of the States because it would still
require subjecting States to suit by private parties, and would
give Congress power over States' own courts, 90thus constituting
an egregious intrusion into States' sovereignty. 1
1'4Id.

at 730.

85

'86 Id. at 732.
1

Id. at 741.
527 U.S. at 742-43.
745-46.

117Alden,
188Id.
at
89

Id. at 748.
'90 Id. at 749. According to the Court, "A power to press a State's own courts

into federal service to coerce the other branches of the State, furthermore, is
the power first to turn the State against itself and ultimately to commandeer
the entire political machinery of the State against its will and at the behest of
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The Alden Court emphasized that one can still limit the reach
of the Eleventh Amendment and the States' "inherent" sovereign
immunity by relying on the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 191 that
is, by bringing an action for injunctive or declaratory relief
against state officials in their official capacity to address an ongoing violation of state law in state of federal court' 92 . Thus, Ex
Parte Young continues to provide a means for securing state
compliance with federal law.
B. Reeves v. Sanderson: Proving Disparate Treatment
In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Productions,193 the Court
clarified the framework of proof in disparate treatment cases after
the confusion generated by its 1991 decision in St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks, 19 4 announcing that if a plaintiff has made out her

prima facie case and the fact finder disbelieves the reasons put
forward by the defendant for its action, a fact finder is permitted
to find intentional discrimination. In addition, the Reeves Court
also made clear that the standard for granting summary judgment
mirrors the standard of judgment as a matter of law, and that
under both standards the judge must, reviewing the record as a
whole, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
195
party, and must respect the role of the fact-finder.
Accordingly, once a plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to
raise an issue of fact as to a defendant's proffered
nondiscriminatory justification, summary judgment and judgment
as a matter of law will ordinarily be inappropriate. 196
The components of a plaintiff's burden in employment
discrimination cases wherein direct evidence of discrimination is
individuals." Id. The Alden Court also noted that even though States could
assert sovereign immunity against private actions, they were still required to
follow the Constitution and federal statutes "that comport with the
constitutional design." Id. at 754-55.
l9' 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
192 Alden,

527 U.S. at 747-48.
120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000).
194 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).
'9' Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2109-10.
193

196

Id. at 2109.
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not available was established in the Court's decisions in
McDonnelll Douglas Corp. v. Green, 197 and Texas Departmentof
Community Affairs v. Burdine.198 The McDonnell DouglasBurdine framework, which originated in Title VII cases and was
soon widely applied by lower courts to other employment
discrimination statutes such as the ADEA, as well as other
discrimination statues, set out the now familiar three part
framework for proving discrimination.
The prima facie
requirements vary depending on the factual situation and the
action at issue. 199

In a failure to hire case, for example, a

plaintiff would show: (1) membership in a protected group; (2)
that she applied for the position and that she was minimally
qualified for the position; (3) that despite her qualifications she
was rejected; (4) and that after her rejection the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants
with similar qualifications. 2 00 Proof of a prima facie case then
shifts the burden of production to the defendant "to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's
rejection." 20 1 The defendant's reasons need not be proved by a
preponderance of evidence, but the defendant must "clearly set
forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the
reasons for the plaintiff's rejection." 202 In order to prevail, the
reasons must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the
defendant.2 °3

The confusion arises at the third part of the framework. If
the plaintiff succeeds in disproving the defendant's legitimate
non-discriminatory reason, the question becomes whether: (1)
judgment must be entered in her favor; (2) judgment may be
entered in her favor only if she proves that discrimination was the
reason for the adverse action; or (3) whether judgment may be
entered in her favor even without additional proof. Language in
197 411

U.S. 792, 802 (1973).

...
450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
199 Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2109.
200 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
20! Id.
202

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55.

20' Id. at 255.
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Burdine seemed quite clearly to suggest that a plaintiff may
prevail "either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or
indirectly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason
more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that
the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence. 20 4 After Burdine, there was confusion on this point,
with some courts of appeal holding that finding the reasons pretextual did not mandate a ruling for the plaintiff, 20 5 and others
holding that a finding of pretext did mandate such a ruling.20 6 In
Hicks, the Court made clear that upon a showing of pretext,
judgment as a matter of law for the plaintiff was not required.207
But the Hicks decision itself generated additional confusion by its
conflicting language on whether disproving pretext could support
a finding for the plaintiff. While the Court on the one hand states
that "it is not enough ... to disbelieve the employer, 20 8 and that
the plaintiff must show "both that the reason was false, and that
discrimination was the real reason," 20 9 the Court also states that
"rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the
trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional
discrimination., 210
The majority of the courts of appeal
interpreted Hicks to allow a finding of discrimination upon proof
of pretext.211 Some, however, reconciled the conflicting language
Id. at 256 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., EEOC v. Flasher, 986 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir. 1992); Galbraith v.
Northern Telecom, Inc., 944 F.2d 275, 283 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 945 (1992).
206 See, e.g., King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Duffy v.
Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1396 (3d Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984).
207 Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
28
1 Id. at 519.
209
Id. at 515.
204
205

210

Id. at 511 (emphasis added).

See, e.g., Sheridan v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061,
1068-69 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Shaw v. HCA Health Servs. Of Midwest,
Inc., 79 F.3d 100 (8th Cir. 1996): Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1277
(D.C. Cir. 1995): EEOC v. Ethan Allen, Inc. 44 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir.
1994); Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1083
211
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in Hicks as merely emphasizing that the ultimate burden of
212
persuasion of intentional discrimination rests with the plaintiff.
In Reeves, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's
denial of defendant's post-verdict motion for judgment as a
matter of law, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 50, and held that
plaintiff had presented insufficient evidence to establish that his
termination was in violation of the ADEA. 213 Roger Reeves, the
fifty-seven year-old plaintiff, had been employed for 40 years at
Sanderson, a company that manufactured toilet seats and covers.
Reeves worked in a department of the company known as the
Hinge room and was supervised by 35-year-old Joe Oswalt. Both
Oswalt and Sanderson were supervised by 45-year-old Russell
Caldwell, who was the manager of their department.214 In the
fall of 1993, Powe Chestnut, director of Quality control,
conducted a review of procedures in the Hinge room and, finding
productivity problems, placed Reeves on a ninety-day
suspension. Almost three years later, in the summer 1995,
Reeves' direct supervisor, Caldwell, informed Chestnut that the
Hinge room had productivity problems, and suggested that they
were due to serious absenteeism and tardiness.
An audit
conducted by the new Director of Quality Control revealed
numerous timekeeping errors and misrepresentations. After the
President of Human Resources conducted an independent review
of the records and confirmed the findings of Quality control, the
company President, Sandra Sanderson, dismissed both Caldwell
and Reeves. The company then filled Reeves' position three
successive times with men in their thirties.215
In June 1996, Reeves filed suit claiming that his termination
violated the ADEA. The jury found in his favor and awarded
him $35,000. The jury also found that the discrimination against
him was willful. The district court granted Reeves an additional
$35,000 in liquidated damages based on the jury's determination
(6th Cir. 1994); Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120: 1124
(7th Cir. 1994).
212 See, e.g., Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1068-69.
213 Reeves v. Sanderson, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2111 (2000).
214 Reeves v. Sanderson, 197 F.3d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1999).
21- Id. at 690-91.
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of willfulness, and $28,490.80 in front pay due to Reeves' two
years of lost income. 1 6 The district court also denied the
company's motion for judgment as a matter of law. 217
The Fifth Circuit reversed, rejecting Reeves' evidence of
discrimination and stating that even if the company's
nondiscriminatory explanation for the termination were (shoddy
record keeping), untrue,218 Reeves could not prevail unless he
also presented sufficient evidence that his age motivated the
employment decision. 21 9 The panel then proceeded to find
Reeves' evidence of discrimination insufficient as a matter of
law.220

Reeves had presented evidence that Chestnut had made two
age-related comments several months before he was fired,
"namely (1) that Reeves was so old that he must have come over
on the Mayflower," and (2) that he was "too damn old to do the
job. ,2 2 1 The panel found these statements insufficient to justify a
jury finding of age discrimination because these comments were
not made in the "direct context" of Reeves' termination, and
because other individuals, not simply Chestnut, were responsible
for Reeves' termination decision.222 In addition, the individuals
responsible for Plaintiff's termination were themselves over the
age of fifty. 223 The court similarly found unpersuasive Reeves'
argument that he was treated less favorably than the company's
younger employees, a claim that Reeves sought to support by
testimony that Chestnut treated him like a child; that Oswalt, who
216 Id.at
217 Id. at

691.
691.
218 Id. at 693. Reeves presented evidence that the company's explanation had
changed between the time of discharge and the time of trial. At the time of
discharge, the company, according to Reeves, had indicated to him that he
"had caused a specific employee to be paid for time she had not actually
worked" while at trial they had claimed that his "timekeeping mistakes had
resulted in the overpayment of numerous employees." Id. To the Fifth
Circuit, this minor inconsistency could "hardly be considered mendacious."
Id.
219 Reeves, 197 F.3d at 693.
220 Id. at 693.
221
Id. at 691.
22 Id. at 693-94.
223Id. at 694.
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was thirty-five, was not also put on probation in 1993 despite a
similar law production level; and by the fact that only he was
singled out in 1995 for an audit. The panel found this evidence
unconvincing, pointing out that after the 1995 investigation, each
of the three Hinge Room supervisors were accused of inaccurate
record keeping, not simply Reeves.224 Additionally, at the time
Reeves was dismissed, "20 of the company's management
positions were filled by people over the age of 50 including
several employees in their late 60's. ' '22s And thus, the Fifth
Circuit reversed the jury verdict and rendered judgment in favor
of the company.226
In an unanimous opinion, written by Justice O'Connor, the
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Fifth Circuit.
According to the Court, the Fifth Circuit erred by confining its
review of the evidence to a showing that "Chestnut had directed
derogatory, age based comments at petitioner and that Chestnut
had singled out petitioner for harsher treatment than younger
employees." 227
Such a formulation "misconceived the
evidentiary burden borne by plaintiffs who attempt to prove
intentional discrimination through indirect evidence. " s The
Court clarified that while Hicks held that disbelief of the
employer's proffered reasons did not cbmpel a finding of fact for
plaintiffs, such a finding was permitted.229 Furthermore, the
Court noted, once the employer's reasons have been eliminated,
"discrimination may well be the most likely alternative
explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position
to put forth the actual reason for its decision." 230 The Court
cautioned however that plaintiffs prima facie case coupled with
disbelief of the defendant's explanation will not "always" be
adequate to sustain a jury's finding of liability:

224

id.
Reeves, 197 F.3d at 694.

226 Id.

2-7 Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2108.

"gId.
2-9 Id. at 2109.
0Id.at 2108-09.
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For instance, an employer would be entitled to judgment
as a matter of law if the record conclusively revealed
some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's
decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of
fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and
there was abundant and un-controverted independent
evidence that no discrimination had occurred. 23'
According to the Court, the propriety of granting judgment as a
matter of law will depend on a range of factors including the
strength of plaintiff's prima facie case and the "probative
value
232
false."
is
explanation
employer's
the
that
proof
the
of
The Court then held that the Fifth Circuit erred in granting
judgment as a matter of law. Spelling out the proper method for
review of Rule 50233 and 56234 motions, the Court explained that
a court must look at the entire evidence in the record. 235 The
Court emphasized however that, "the court must draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party [and] it
may not make credibility determinations or weigh the
evidence. , 236 In the case at hand, the Court found that judgment
as a matter of law was inappropriate because, in addition to
establishing a prima facie ease and creating an issue for the jury
as to the defendant's proffered explanation, the plaintiff had
introduced additional evidence of age-based discrimination.
Because the Fifth Circuit not only misconstrued the nature of the
plaintiff's burden in this case, but also failed to draw reasonable
inferences in favor of plaintiff, it had erred in overturning the
jury verdict.237
Significantly, Justice Ginsburg wrote separately to emphasize
that, while the Court might have to refine its pronouncements in
subsequent decisions, the Court's opinion suggests that once a
23'

Id. at 2109.

232 Id.
23'
234

FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2110.

235
236 Id.
23 7

Id. at 2110-11.

2000

SUPREME COURTDEVELOPMENTS

1279

plaintiff has presented
a prima facie case and
"introduced... evidence" casting doubt on the employer's
explanation, the case should "ordinarily not be taken from the
jury. "238 As Justice Ginsburg's concurrence suggests, the Reeves
decision could prove to the benefit of plaintiffs in employment
cases by making it more difficult to grant summary judgment or
reverse a jury verdict where an employee has, after presenting
his or her prima facie case, at least raised sufficient factual issues
as to the veracity of defendant's explanation.

8
23

Id. at 2112.
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